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Abstract—Social networking sites (SNSs), such as Facebook, 
have become part of everyday use. While many individuals and 
organizations use SNSs to maintain contact and to do a variety of 
services, attackers may see them as a prime target for performing 
different types of attacks. Phishing is one of the most common 
attacks, and one of the most challenging problems in SNSs. 
Existing human behaviours literature related to social capital, 
habitual usage, and risk perception shows a strong indication that 
it is possible to predict Facebook users’ susceptibility to phishing 
victimization based on their demographics, anonymity, social 
capital, and risk perception. Using quantitative survey, this paper 
aims to predict Facebook users’ susceptibility to phishing 
victimization based on these factors. Among the hypothesized 
factors, we found that it is possible to predict user’s susceptibility 
to phishing victimization based on the user’s anonymity status, the 
number of all friends the user is connected to, the number of 
strangers that the user is connected to, and the number of close 
friends that the user is connected to. 
Keywords— phishing; social engineering; deception; social 
networks; susceptibility ; Facebook 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Social networking sites, such as Facebook, have become 
part of everyday use. While many individuals and 
organizations use SNSs to maintain contact and to do a 
variety of services, attackers may see social networking sites 
as a prime target for deceiving users, attacking their 
organizations, or performing different types of attacks. This 
is not a recent phenomenon; as early as 2005 the Institute of 
Management and Administration identified social 
engineering as the primary security threat. Indeed, these 
threats are on the rise owing to the improvements that have 
been witnessed in technology-based threats [1]. A survey 
conducted by Dimension Research (2011) on 850 IT and 
security professionals living in Germany, Australia, the US, 
the UK, New Zealand and Canada revealed that 48% of 
those who participated had fallen for social engineering 
based attacks with 25 or more attacks in 2010 and 2011. The 
report states that per security incident, social engineering 
based incidents cost victimised organizations an average of 
$25,000 to $100,000. Moreover, the report indicated that 
around 39% of the participants believe that SNSs are the 
most common source of social engineering threats [2]. Most 
organisations are conscious of social engineering and other 
deception threats but the majority fail to control such threats 
[3]. Furthermore, a study that involved more than 4,000 
Facebook users found that most participants expose 
themselves to various physical and cyber risks by providing 
large amounts of personal information in SNSs [4]. Now, the 
use of SNSs as the main tool of social interaction results in a 
loss of privacy [5]. This therefore opens users and their 
originations or networks to becoming targets of major 
security threats [6]. 
According to the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report 
in 2010, 84.5% of all phishing attacks target SNSs users in 
the recent times [7]. Phishing is a type of social engineering 
technique used to collect privacy information; users are 
manipulated to type or provide critical information, like their 
passwords and usernames [8]. It can gather information that 
tricks the users into falling victims to phishing [9]. 
Moreover, messages and posts that feature on SNSs can be 
effectively used to increase the likelihood that victims will 
respond to phishing attacks [10]. Theoretical development in 
information security, trust and privacy research is immature 
relative to other areas of study and other disciplines. Users’ 
behaviour regarding deception victimization continues to 
suffer from a limited theoretical base, restricting our 
collective ability to predict and detect phishing attacks in 
social networking sites. This study aims to predict Facebook 
users’ susceptibility to phishing based on their 
demographics, anonymity status, usage, social capital, and 
risk perception. Existing human behaviours literature related 
to these concepts shows a strong indication that such 
relationship is exit. The remainder of this paper is organized 
as follows. In Section II, literature review and hypotheses are 
explained. In Section III, the methodology is presented. In 
Section IV, the analysis and results are presented. And 
finally, the study concludes with Section V. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
A. Risk perception 
The Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) proposes that 
individuals protect themselves based on four factors: the 
perceived severity of a threatening event, the perceived 
vulnerability (the probability of the occurrence of that 
threat), the efficacy of the recommended preventive action or 
behaviour, and the perceived self-efficacy [11]. Due to the 
fact that many security related behaviours are difficult to be 
examined with ensuring ethical requirements associated with 
running such experiment in the actual life, PMT theory has 
given a solid theoretical foundation for several studies in 
information security [12]. That is, it allows researchers to 
predict individuals’ behaviours regarding risky actions by 
studying their perception toward one or more of the factors 
involved in PMT theory. This is observed clearly in the 
environment of SNSs such as Facebook, where it is almost 
impossible to examine users’ reactions towards risky action, 
such as phishing, in accordance with ethical requirements. 
Therefore, we will use the most highly trusted factors of 
PMT theory, namely, perceived severity of a threatening 
event and the perceived vulnerability, in order to predict 
users’ susceptibility to phishing victimization in Facebook. 
B. Strangers 
Research found that there is a strong relationship 
between connection to strangers on Facebook and 
victimization to phishing. The more strangers a user has, the 
more susceptible to fall victim for phishing. For example, 
Algarni  and Xu [13] suggest that connection to strangers in 
SNSs is a main source of social engineering victimization, 
including phishing. They explain that attackers can use the 
psychological motivation of human nature to make 
“friendship” with potential victims in order to build trust, and 
then abuse this trust to launch variety of social engineering 
attacks. According to Davis, Farnham and Jensen [14], the 
main reason why there are so many bad behaviours in 
various online social media platforms is the fact that social 
networking sites do not properly invoke the various social 
norms for proper interpersonal behaviours among users. As 
people communicate more and more, the level of trust also 
increases meaning an increasing level of probability of users 
sharing information especially when such trust has been well 
developed. The relationship between making connection 
(friendships) with strangers on Facebook and susceptibility 
to phishing victimization has been observed also in an 
experiment done by [10], who found that close to one in five 
respondents have accepted to make a friendship with a 
stranger on Facebook, and one in ten fell victim to phishing 
attack from that stranger. This could be because most of the 
users who do not perceive strangers to be threat, don’t also 
perceive phishing as severe threat. Vishwanath [10] refers to 
connection to strangers as level 1 attack, and phishing as 
level 2 attack. He found in his research that level 1 attack 
leads to level 2 attacks. Vishwanath [10], however, has 
studied the relationship between them but without providing 
explanation of such relationship. His experiment also was 
done toward one phishing trick, and lacks of control group 
that helps researchers to make conclusion regarding this 
relationship. One way of approving or rejecting, and help to 
understand this relationship, is through addressing whether 
those who connected to strangers have different perception 
toward phishing attack. 
Recall that PMT theory stated that individuals are less 
susceptible to victimization when their perception to such a 
threat is high. Similarly, PMT theory stated that individuals 
are less susceptible to victimization when their perception to 
their own vulnerabilities to such a threat is high [11]. 
Therefore, based on the proposition of PMT, and the 
relationship between connection to strangers and 
victimization to phishing, we hypothesize the following: 
 H1: Number of strangers that a particular user is 
connected to on Facebook is negatively related to the 
perceived severity of phishing threat. 
H2: Number of strangers that a particular user is 
connected to on Facebook is negatively related to the 
perceived vulnerability toward phishing threat. 
C. Anonymity 
When discussing user susceptibility to phishing, 
anonymity is one important consideration to make. 
Measuring anonymity on Facebook can be through the type 
of name that the user use as identifier. The use of nicknames 
is where the users do not use their actual names on Facebook 
and hence protecting their identity from other users. This 
means high level of anonymity, in which other users will not 
be able to identify that user.  
There are several studies that investigated the 
relationship between anonymity and privacy concerns (e.g., 
[15-17]). Users who use nicknames are more likely believe 
in the severity of the threat that could occur to their personal 
information. Research showed that many users are concerns 
about privacy related to data matching issues, data mining 
issues, transferring the personal information to other 
companies, collecting information about the users by the 
sites themselves, collecting information about the users by 
other sources such as newspapers, blogs, and instant 
messaging services [16, 18, 19]. Those people who are 
concerned about their privacy are more likely tend to protect 
their identities by increasing their anonymity. In different 
words, users who are more concerned with their privacy, are 
more likely to use nicknames, and therefore are more likely 
to have high level of severity perception. Therefore, we can 
hypothesize the following: 
H3: Anonymity of Facebook users is positively related to 
the perceived severity of phishing threat. 
On the other hand, Vance et al. (2014) noted that 
maintaining anonymity provides users with a perception of 
safety against threats since their identity is not known [12]. 
This means that users who use nicknames believe that they 
are less vulnerable to threat. That is, users with anonymity on 
Facebook more likely feel safer meaning that their perceived 
vulnerability is reduced. Such users feel that when their 
names are unknown, attackers cannot target them in 
particular. When their names are hidden, they think that 
attackers are less likely to know other details about them. 
This is supported by the study of Cho and Kim (2012) who 
stated that users, who don’t use their real identity, feel that 
attackers cannot get their other information [20]. 
Accordingly the use of nicknames means that the users are 
sure they cannot be identified and hence making them 
perceive that their vulnerability to such threats being low 
[12]. The negative relationship between anonymity and 
perceived vulnerability is further supported by 
deindividualism principle [21-23]. By using nicknames in 
SNSs such as Facebook, deindividualism is created where 
there lacks self-awareness of the users. Because the users 
who use nicknames think that they are not easily identifiable, 
they become less self-awareness, and therefore they will 
have less perceived vulnerability even though they perceive 
the threat as severe.  
The impact of using real or nickname has been observed 
in practice as well. In South Korea, the implementation of 
the Real Name Verification Law for the various main 
websites in the country was aimed at reducing the cases of 
aggressive posting which would cause defamation and 
slanders. This however did not mean that the actual names 
were displayed on all the websites as some adopted a 
pseudonyms system of naming the users. The aim of using 
this anonymity was to ensure that even though the users were 
known in the background, their personal information, 
including their real names, are not displayed to the public. 
This helps in ensuring that there is more active participation 
by the users in commenting as they are more confident of 
being less likely to be targeted personally.  This is shown by 
the fact that in South Korea, the rate of aggressive posts 
decreased where pseudonyms were used as compared to, 
where the actual real names of the users were used. This 
hence means that if they use the nicknames, their information 
cannot be easily accessed hence reducing the possibility of 
actual threats to the users [20].   
In summary, perceiving the severity of threat, such as 
phishing, leads users to increase their anonymity by using 
nicknames (as hypothesized in H3). On the other hand, by 
using nicknames the users become more confident of their 
identity being unknown to the general public or to the users 
within their networks. This leads the users who use 
nicknames to believe that it is hard for others to identify or 
attack them, and hence reducing the perceived vulnerability 
of them. Therefore, we can hypothesize the following:  
H4: Anonymity of Facebook user is negatively related to 
the perceived vulnerability toward phishing threat. 
D. Social Capital 
Social relationships between people are different in their 
types and strength [24]. There have been several studies that 
intended to study how people in different societies 
communicate. The collective benefits and goodwill derived 
from cooperation between individuals in certain society or 
group of people is  known as social capital [25] . Putnam 
[25] has suggested two main types of social capital. The first 
type is the bridging social capital, in which an individual has 
many (but relatively weak) ties with other members in that 
society or social network. The second type is the bonding 
social capital, in which an individual has less number of ties 
(but relatively strong) with other members in the society or 
the network. Vitak, Ellison and Steinfield [26] have 
examined these two types on Facebook as well. Facebook 
users also found to have similar types of social capitals. 
The main goal of Facebook is interaction among the 
users which is aimed at establishing or maintaining already 
existing relationships among various users. By engaging in 
searches for people that users may know, Facebook allows 
people to have an online connection with people who know 
each other offline. It also allows the creation of new 
connections with people who may be strangers in the offline 
life hence meaning a user will have both close friends and 
strangers as part of their Facebook friends. Facebook has 
played a very big role in increasing the social capital. The 
only backside is that these friendships are not close due to 
the geographical gap and hence not as close as they should 
be. This gap hence means that the users may have many 
Facebook friends (bridging social capital) but as long as they 
are not their close friends they cannot trust them with their 
personal information. As mentioned before, a user in this 
type of social capital is connected to many members, but 
these connections are weak sine the majority of them are 
strangers to the user. Therefore, the user more likely 
perceives them to be a source of potential threats, or who 
may potentially phish or attack those [27].This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H5: Users’ number of friends (bridging social capital) is 
positively related to perceived severity of phishing threat.   
On the other hand, the second type of social capital is the 
bonding social capital. As mentioned before, users in this 
type use Facebook to make connection with their offline or 
close friends or family members (bonding social capital 
type). Those users are more likely to believe that their 
friends on Facebook are harmless since they are close to 
them, well known to them offline, and have strong 
relationships with them. Users with many close friends or 
connections therefore tend to perceive that their vulnerability 
(susceptibility) is low. Previous work has also showed that 
users tend to feel safer when they have many close friends 
[28]. 
This comes from the fact that they trust those friends and 
they do not perceive that they will be attacked in any 
manner. Such Facebook users feel less vulnerable to cases of 
phishing since they are sure that most of their connections 
are close friends. Therefore, having more close friends will 
likely reduce users’ perception to vulnerability. Based on this 
we can hypothesize: 
H6: Users’ number of close friends is negatively related 
to perceived vulnerability toward phishing threat.  
E. Frequency of Facebook Usage  
Vitak, Ellison and Steinfield [26] have examined the 
relationship between Facebook use and social capital. The 
authors identified a trend that more Facebook use leads to 
more friends. Vishwanath [29] have also found this 
relationship significant. Therefore, based on the finding of 
these studies and considering hypothesis H5, which suggests 
that having more number of friends is positively related to 
perceived severity of threat, we can hypothesize: 
H7: Users’ frequency of Facebook usage is positively 
related to perceived severity of phishing threat. 
F. Users’ Demographics 
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no study to 
understanding the relation between threat perception toward 
the severity of the phishing threat or toward the vulnerability 
of the phishing threat based on users' demographics. 
However, there are a few previous studies that have 
investigated susceptibility to email phishing attacks or have 
shown the effectiveness of having anti-phishing courses to 
avoid email phishing. For example, [9] wanted to measure 
how reliable social context would increase the success of a 
phishing attack. They targeted college students aged 18–24 
years old at Indiana University. Phishing attack was 
launched by using information harvested from social 
networking sites. In their study there were 487 participants to 
determine whether the participants fell for the attack by 
providing their personal information to the phishing website. 
They found that the percentage of Female students fell to the 
phishing attacks was 77%, while the percentage of male 
students fell was 65%.  
In a related study, Kumaraguru, Cranshaw, Acquisti, 
Cranor, Hong, Blair and Pham [30] studied the effectiveness 
of using long-term of PhishGuru anti-phishing training 
system with 515 participants. They found that the training 
did not make difference for users’ willingness to click on 
links in legitimate messages. They found that there was no 
significant difference in gender to be victim for phishing 
emails before and after the training, but they found that 
participants aged 18-25 years old were more vulnerable to 
phishing attacks than older participants. 
As past studies have shown, there has been a differences 
in phishing susceptibility based on user demographics such 
age and gender. In general, they did not harvest enough 
information about study participants to separate these 
variables from other potentially confounding factors. In 
addition, why these demographic factors associate with 
falling for phishing has not been addressed in previous 
studies.   
Darwish, Zarka, and Aloul (2012) conducted a review of 
recent studies of email phishing attacks to understand the 
relationship between the victims’ backgrounds and their 
susceptibility to phishing victimization. They found that user 
demographics are important factors in phishing susceptibility 
[31]. Based on those previous mentioned studies, it is high 
likely that users with some demographics are more 
susceptible to phishing than others. However, there is a lack 
of understanding the reason behind this susceptibility. One 
way of understanding the reason is to investigate their 
perception toward the severity of the phishing threat or 
toward their vulnerabilities toward phishing threat. In this 
study we hypothesize that there is a relationship between 
demographics and their perception toward the severity of the 
phishing threat and toward their vulnerability, as following: 
H8: Users’ age, gender, and educational level have 
significant impact on users’ perceived severity of phishing 
threat on Facebook. 
H9: Users’ age, gender, and educational level have 
significant impact on users’ perceived vulnerability toward 
phishing threat on Facebook. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Using Questionnaire 
Quantitative approach was used to test the research 
hypotheses. This was done through online quantitative 
questionnaire. This approach is the most frequently used 
techniques in information systems [32]. The quantitative 
questionnaire found to be very effective in gathering 
information about actions, opinions, and attitudes on a large 
population. Queensland University of Technology key 
survey application was utilized for developing and 
publishing the questionnaire. SPSS version 21.0 statistical 
software was used to analyze the collected data.  
B. Measurement 
As suggested by many researchers such as [33, 34], pre-
existing measurement scales were used to measure perceived 
severity of the threat and perceived vulnerability.  The scales 
have been developed and tested several times and therefore 
they are more valid and reliable to be used [35-37]. To make 
the study more specific for Facebook, the phrase “on 
Facebook” has been added to every question. Five point 
Likert scale was used for the following items to allow 
participants to choose from. The scales that were used are the 
following:  
Threat severity 
 I believe that protecting my confidential information on Facebook 
is: Unimportant . . . important  (Severity1) 
 Threats to the security of my confidential information on 
Facebook are: Harmless . . . severe (Severity2) 
 Having my confidential information accessed by someone without 
my consent or knowledge on Facebook is: Harmless . . . severe 
(Severity3) 
 Having someone on Facebook successfully attack and damage my 
system is: Harmless . . . severe (Severity4) 
 Threats from social engineering or phishing on Facebook are: 
Harmless . . . severe (Severity5) 
Threat vulnerability 
 I believe that trying to protect my confidential information on 
Facebook will reduce illegal access to it: Unlikely . . . likely 
(Vulnerability1) 
 The likelihood of someone getting my confidential information 
without my consent or knowledge on Facebook is: Unlikely . . . 
likely (Vulnerability2) 
 The likelihood of a social engineering violation occurring to me on 
Facebook is: Unlikely . . . likely (Vulnerability3) 
 The vulnerability of my confidential information to security 
violations on Facebook is: Invulnerable . . . vulnerable 
(Vulnerability4) 
In addition, participants have been asked about other 
variables involved in the hypotheses, which include total 
number of friends the participant has, number of close 
friends that the participant is connected to on Facebook, 
number of strangers that the participant is connected to on 
Facebook, frequency of Facebook usage, type of name that 
the participant uses as identifier (real name, nickname, or 
participant nickname), and other demographics variables 
(such as age, gender, and educational level). 
C. Approach and Sample 
To avoid any sampling bias, and to be able to control 
response rate, we have chosen the participants from Saudi 
Arabia. Since the target participants are Facebook users, we 
approached the participants using Facebook itself as a 
primary strategy. An invitation to participate was 
disseminated using some popular pages/groups on Facebook. 
Those groups also have been chosen as the members who 
visit and participate in these groups represent variety of 
demographics. The participants approached were any Saudi, 
who are 18 years old or over, and have one or more account 
in Facebook. As a second strategy for disseminating the 
invitation, researcher posted a status update on his personal 
Facebook account and also encouraged his friends and 
colleagues to do the same. In total, 288 participants have 
answered the questionnaire, and 282 of them passed the data 
screening procedures. Those participants represent variety of 
demographics including gender, age and education level. All 
the activities of this project have been categorized under 
‘Low Risk Applications’ in accordance with the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving 
Humans (Australian National Statement). 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULT 
A. Data Screening  
The data screening process started by addressing missing 
values, such missing values are commonly occurred in 
quantitative questionnaires for many reasons such as entering 
errors. There are different algorithms to address the messing 
values depending on the number and type of missing values. 
The missing values in this study were relatively small and 
randomly between variables. Therefore, as suggested by Von 
Hippel [38], EM algorithm implemented in SPSS has been 
used to address those missing values. The second step was 
normality distribution assessment. We assessed the normality 
distribution based on the values of Skewness and Kurtosis 
for every variable. The values of skewness were less than 2, 
and the values of kurtosis in this study were less than 4, and 
therefore they indicate that the data is normally distributed 
[39-41]. 
B. Reliability of Scale 
After data screening, we tested the reliability of the 
measurement using Cronbach’s alpha [42]. Cronbach’s alpha 
is the most common method for assessing the internal 
consistency of a scale [43]. Although we have used pre-
existing measurement scales, as have been explained before, 
we double check by testing the reliability of the 
measurement items before doing further analysis. All items 
seem to be adequate except the last item (i.e., Vulnerability4) 
used to measure the vulnerability construct, therefore we 
removed it from the items list and used the rest of other three 
items. As presented in Table I, the overall Cronbach’s alpha 
was .713.  
TABLE I.   RELIABILITY TEST USING CRONBACH’S ALPHA 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Severity1 25.6766 19.961 .445 .683 
severity2 27.0775 17.735 .496 .664 
severity3 26.8211 17.292 .515 .659 
severity4 26.1059 18.564 .460 .674 
severity5 26.2087 19.463 .345 .697 
Vulnerability1 26.3379 19.287 .340 .699 
Vulnerability 2 26.6227 18.969 .361 .695 
Vulnerability 3 26.7346 19.064 .311 .708 
C. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis is important as well in order 
to test the constructs validity. For this purpose, we used 
principle component analysis implemented in SPSS with 
varimax rotation. The result showed two constructs with 
eigenvalues larger than 1. As presented in Table II, the 
loading for every item is greater than 0.60 towards its 
construct, and less than 0.40 toward the other construct. This 
therefore suggests construct validity. 
TABLE II.  EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS   
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
Perceived Severity Perceived Vulnerability 
Severity1 .535 .321 
severity2 .784 .060 
severity3 .800 .084 
severity4 .762 .030 
severity5 .669 -.053 
Vulnerability1 .160 .650 
Vulnerability2 .005 .874 
Vulnerability3 -.016 .834 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
D. Hypotheses Testing 
For the hypotheses testing we used multiple regression 
analysis implemented in SPSS. Testing the hypotheses 
started by testing hypotheses H1 and H2. Testing H1 and H2 
includes testing path coefficients between the number of 
strangers as dependent variable and the perceived 
vulnerability and perceived severity of the threat as 
independent variables. Table III shows the results of the 
regression analysis to test these relationships. The 
coefficients for both perceived vulnerability and perceived 
severity found to be statistically significant at p<=0.05.  
These results suggest accepting the hypotheses H1 and H2. 
TABLE III.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS TO PREDICT NUMBER OF 
STRANGERS 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) 5.688 .957  5.943 .000 
Perceived_Severity -.413 .195 -.128 -2.123 .035 
Perceived_Vulnerab
ility 
-.496 .216 -.139 -2.294 .023 
a. Dependent Variable: Strangers 
 
Then, multiple regression analysis was done to test the 
hypotheses H3, H5, H7, and H8. Table IV presents the 
regression analysis using SPSS where the dependent variable 
is perceived severity of a threat. The results show significant 
coefficient (at p<=0.05) for anonymity, number of all 
friends, and number of strangers. The results however show 
that all other variables are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the result suggests accepting the hypotheses H3 
and H5 and rejecting the hypotheses H7 and H8. 
Similarly, multiple regression analysis was done to test 
the hypotheses H4, H6, and H9. Table V presents the 
regression analysis using SPSS where the dependent variable 
is perceived vulnerability. The results show significant 
coefficient (at p<=0.05) for number of close friends, and 
number of strangers. The results, however, show that all 
other variables are not statistically significant. Therefore, the 
result suggests accepting the hypotheses H6 and rejecting the 
hypotheses H4, and H9. 
TABLE IV.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS TO PREDICT PERCEIVED SEVERITY   
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.434 .263  13.071 .000 
Gender .076 .186 .052 .887 .376 
Anonymity .144 .060 .142 2.399 .017 
Age -.050 .033 -.096 -1.541 .125 
Education_Level .096 .063 .092 1.533 .127 
Frequency_of_Usage -.017 .035 -.031 -.481 .631 
Number_of_All_Friends .035 .015 .208 2.397 .017 
Number_of_Strangers -.085 .024 -.276 -3.495 .001 
Number_of_Close_Frien
ds 
.004 .021 .014 .197 .844 
a. Dependent Variable: Percieved_Severity 
 
TABLE V.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS TO PREDICT PERCEIVED 
VULNERABILITY 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardi
zed 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.896 .238  16.352 .000 
Gender -.013 .078 -.010 -.164 .870 
Anonymity .027 .054 .030 .489 .619 
Age .046 .030 .097 1.554 .121 
Education_Level -.048 .057 -.052 -.849 .397 
Frequency_of_Usage -.034 .032 -.070 -1.078 .282 
Number_of_All_Friends .019 .013 .122 1.393 .165 
Number_of_Strangers -.047 .022 -.167 -2.123 .035 
Number_of_Close_Friends -.051 .019 -.199 -2.726 .007 
a. Dependent Variable: Vulnerability 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study aimed to study the relationship between 
anonymity, social capital, habitual use, and risk perception 
towards phishing attack on Facebook. This study included 9 
hypotheses. As presented in Figure 1, the result of the 
analysis suggests accepting the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5, 
and H6 and rejecting the hypotheses H4, H7, H8 and H9. In 
the following sections, we will discuss the insight of these 
findings. 
A. Perceived Severity, Perceived Vulnerability and 
Number of Strangers 
Testing the hypotheses H1 and H2 involved testing the 
possibility of predicting the number of strangers by the 
perceived vulnerability and perceived severity of the threat. 
The rationale of testing this is to test the assumptions of 
PMT theory, which stated that perceived severity of a 
threatening event, and the perceived vulnerability, have 
impact of people response to a particular threat. The number 
of strangers in this study represents the actual behaviors of 
users, which also represents to what extent those participants 
have fallen in the attack (considering the results of 
Vishwanath [29] that indicates that connection to strangers is 
considered as falling for level 1 attacks). As presented in 
Table III, the result of this study approved the relationship 
between the perceived severity of a threatening event, and 
the perceived vulnerability and connection with strangers on 
Facebook. While [13] have suggested that connection with 
strangers is a main source of threat, and while [10] has 
suggested a strong relationship between accepting friendship 
from strangers on Facebook and falling for phishing on 
Facebook, this study approved the relationship using an 
actual behavior measurement. That is, the study tested the 
actual past behavior of users (number of strangers they are 
already connected to) and the perception of severity and 
vulnerability towards phishing attack on Facebook (which 
have been suggested by PMT theory).  
 
Figure 1.  The relationship between anonymity, social capital, habitual 
use, and risk perception 
B. Predicting Perceived Severity 
Testing the hypotheses H3, H5, H7, and H8 was done to 
test the possibility of predicting the perceived severity of a 
threat based on other variables included in the hypotheses, 
which include number of friends, number of close friends, 
frequency of usage, anonymity (type of name used as 
identifier), and demographics variables such as age, gender, 
and educational level. These results suggest that it is possible 
to predict perceived severity of a threat based on type of the 
name that the user uses as identifier (anonymity), number of 
all friends the user is connected to, and number of strangers 
that the user is connected to. 
C. Predicting Perceived Vulnerability 
Testing the hypotheses H4, H6, and H9 was done to test 
the possibility of predicting the perceived vulnerability based 
on other variables included in the hypotheses, which include 
number of friends, number of close friends, frequency of 
usage, anonymity (type of name used as identifier), and 
demographics variables such as age, gender, and educational 
level. These results suggest that it is possible to predict 
perceived vulnerability based on the number of close friends 
that the user is connected to, and number of strangers that the 
user is connected to. 
D. Unsupported Hypotheses 
The result of this study indicated that frequency of usage, 
age, gender, educational level have no significant impacts on 
the perceived severity of the phishing threat or the perceived 
vulnerability on Facebook. The result of this study also 
shows that anonymity has no significant impact on perceived 
vulnerability. It is not uncommon that behavior research 
finds unsupported hypotheses. Finding different or 
unexpected result is also common in the research related to 
virtual environment of SNSs such as Facebook. Several 
studies found the people behaviors in SNSs are different than 
real life situation. However, the unsupported hypotheses are 
interesting points that need further research. 
The scope of the research can also impact the finding. 
That is, recall that PMT theory proposes that individuals 
protect themselves based on four factors: the perceived 
severity of a threatening event, the perceived vulnerability, 
the efficacy of the recommended preventive action or 
behavior, and the perceived self-efficacy [11]. Because we 
have focused in this study on the first two factors of the PMT 
theory, the other two factors can be the reason behind the 
unsupported hypotheses. Therefore, future research can 
focus on, or include, the other two factors of PMT 
(recommended preventive action, and the perceived self-
efficacy) toward phishing. 
E. Limitations 
This study has some limitations worth noting. As 
mentioned before, previous research and theories approved 
that the perception (of severity and vulnerability) influences 
the victimization positively or negatively. In this study we 
stopped at the perception level and have not tested the 
victimization of phishing itself as it requires an experimental 
research. However, we have tested the assumption of the 
relationship between perceived severity and perceived 
vulnerability by asking the participants about the actual 
number of strangers that they are already connected to, 
which has been found an indication of phishing victimization 
in previous studies. The result of this study has eventually 
approved this assumption.  
The second limitation is regarding the sample used. The 
sample of this study was chosen from Saudi Arabia. It was 
better to include a sample that represents variety of cultures 
and countries. The third limitation is that we focused on 
Facebook only and it would be better to test that findings of 
this study is generalizable to all SNSs. The fourth limitation 
is that we have not tested all demographics such as social 
status, educational background, and so on. Finally, to draw a 
conclusion about demographics affect it would be better to 
have larger sample than what have been used in this study. 
F. Implications and Conclusion 
Existing human behaviors literature related to social 
capital, habitual usage, and risk perception shows a strong 
indication that it is possible to predict Facebook users’ 
susceptibility to phishing victimization based on their 
demographics, anonymity, social capital, and risk perception. 
We tested Facebook users’ susceptibility to phishing 
victimization based these four elements.  
Our study is significant to the existing knowledge in two 
ways. First, we investigated the relationship between falling 
victim to phishing victimization in a new environment, 
Facebook, which has different and more challenging 
characteristics than email. Second, we went further by liking 
important theories such as PMT that exist in real life 
situation and from different disciplines such as psychology, 
sociology, and behaviorism to rising problems in a virtual 
environment such as Facebook.  
In addition, our finding is significant to current 
professional practice. Deception attack is relatively new to 
information technology poses the highest security threats, 
and is more difficult to control. However, there has been 
little to help professionals address the problem, other than 
anecdotal materials. Our study contributes to professional 
practice by providing theoretical foundation for developing 
algorithms that predict users’ susceptibility to phishing 
victimization using data mining techniques. 
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